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Abstract  
 
This paper proposes two complementary tools for the description and quantification of 
dynamic effects arising from supply chain cyber-attacks. The first tool proposes a 
comprehensive analysis of the problem space through system dynamics methods, to 
identify explicitly mental models regarding aspects such as stakeholders, relevant 
relationships, feedback effects and potential policy levers. The second tool is proposed as 
a way of transitioning towards a dynamic analysis of the problem of cyber-attacks on 
supply chains, and is complementary to existing risk analysis tools. 
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Introduction  
Cyber-risks are an increasingly relevant phenomenon in supply chain management 
enabled by an information technology-dependent, and increasingly complex supply 
network with ubiquitous access to technology. This is evidenced by recent cyber-attacks 
on organizations, targeting anywhere from their financial systems to confidential product 
or customer information, with potentially severe effects to reputational capital, supply 
operations, and production processes, to name a few. A key difficulty with cyber-attacks 
is that often companies will not know that they are at risk until they are being attacked. 
Competitive pressures are forcing companies to be responsive, and to consider 
network competition where “prizes will go to those organizations that can better structure, 
co-ordinate and manage the relationships with their partners in a network committed to 
delivering superior value in the final market place” (Christopher, 2011). Supply chains 
are thus IT-dependent complex networks of agents in constant exchange of information, 
i.e., data, products and financial resources.  
The two aspects crucial to executives when looking to reduce vulnerabilities are 
security- a preventive aspect which leads to the reduction of the likelihood of a disruption; 
and resilience- the organizational capabilities for returning to normal operating conditions 
after a disruption (Sheffi, 2005). Since cyber-attacks can potentially access and impact 
every company in a shared network, this system will only be as resilient as the weakest 
link in the supply network. 
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Traditional risk management theory has been based on a process of risk identification 
(modes of failure), risk impact evaluation, risk prioritization, preventive action toward 
diminishing the probability of occurrence for the risks with a priority above a certain 
threshold, and subsequent control that these preventive actions were executed. 
However, increasing supply chain complexity is creating modes of failure in a supply 
chain beyond the preventive analysis capabilities of the organization. Therefore, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to foresee every possible way in which a supply chain 
can be disrupted.  
In the case of cyber-risks, this is particularly relevant, as increased dependence on IT 
has been reported to result in an increased number of suppliers in a network (Dederick et 
al., 2008) hence increasing the number of links where cyber-attacks can root and deploy 
to other parts of the target network. 
There seems to be a consensus on what constitutes supply chain risk management 
(Khan et al., 2007), and considers the identification, analysis and control of those supply 
chain risks that could financially undermine the assets or earning capability of an 
organization, within the context of its overall aims. Methods have been developed to 
manage uncertainty in the supply chain, through coordination procedures (Sales & 
Operations Planning, Collaborative Planning Forecasting & Replenishment) for existing 
operations, and risk management (e.g., Business Continuity Planning) to detect additional 
procedures/capabilities required to better manage disruption events. 
This work analyses the literature on supply chain resilience frameworks and cyber-
attack types to analyse the application of these frameworks to cyber risks. This work then 
proposes two types of tools as contributions to bridging the research gap. One of the tools 
is intended towards a systemic description of the problem landscape for creating a 
research agenda, and as a tool to explicitly map the mental models (Doyle et al., 1998) of 
the problem at hand when used through group model building, for example. The second 
tool seeks to bridge the gap between current accepted practices, which themselves fall 
short for the adequate description and management of a dynamic problem, and which is 
presented as a complement to existing risk assessment tools. 
 
Cyber-attack types 
Our analysis of the literature showed that the types of cyber-attacks that can affect supply 
chains have been gathered from two main sources: a) the theoretical development of 
cyber-attack taxonomies and classifications based in information technology research 
(deductive method), and b) through the record and classification of attacks derived from 
information gathered with industrial practitioners (inductive method). 
Furthermore, the analysis showed relevant contributions through the deductive 
approach of the description of supply chain cyber risks from the point of view of IT 
vulnerabilities. These categorizations are derived from a systematic assessment of IT/SC 
structure, are later tested against case studies, and are normally presented as peer-
reviewed articles. 
Gordon (Gordon et al., 2006) developed a cybercrime categorization for these events 
by combining a technology and a human component. If the cyber-attack contained mainly 
technological components, it was denominated type 1, and type 2 if the components were 
mainly human in nature. They further characterized type 1 events as singular or discrete 
from the perspective of the victim, facilitated by the use of crime-ware software and that 
the introduction of this software may not necessarily be facilitated by vulnerabilities. On 
the other hand, they characterized type 2 events as facilitated by processes that do not fit 
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under crime-ware (e.g., Instant Messaging, FTP file transfer), and as having in general 
repeated contacts or events from the perspective of the user. 
Simmons et al., (2014) developed a cyber-attack taxonomy derived from computer 
program security flaws, which classifies threats according to potential defences, and thus 
facilitating the proposal of strategies to manage these risks. Through the identification of 
the ways in which attacks could take place, this group proposes a series of “vectors” 
which form the evaluation framework AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational Impact, 
Defence, Information Impact, and Target). This framework uses a tree structure to 
categorize and enumerate the ways in which an attack might occur. 
On the other hand, an inductive approach has been followed by organizations who 
monitor cyber-attack events to industrial organizations. These studies are normally 
presented as non-peer-reviewed articles or reports. This approach is inductive since it 
starts form the observable experience of cyber-attacks to industry, to subsequently 
propose a categorization or taxonomy that might be more generalizable. The incentives 
for private organizations to generate these reports is to evidence themselves as subject-
matter-experts when offering cyber-security consulting services to industrial companies. 
Additionally, several multinational organizations have started regular updates on cyber 
security with information from its members, such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS, 2013), or the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2008). 
Verizon (Verizon, 2014) has developed Data Breach Investigation Reports (DBIR), 
published yearly, and which gathers information about information breaches from 50 
contributing organizations and spanning 95 countries around the world. This report 
identified 9 main types of breaches, i.e., cyber- espionage, DOS Attacks (denial of 
service), crime ware, web app attacks, insider misuse, miscellaneous errors, physical theft 
and loss, and payment card skimmers. These attack patterns described 92% of the 100.000 
incident database taken into consideration by this study. 
The OAS is issuing a yearly report that shows a 12-40% increase in reported cyber-
attack incidents yet indicates in their latest report, “most states do not differentiate 
between the types or severity of cyber incidents they reported”, and that “divergent views 
show that more specific data is needed to accurately diagnose the threat” (OAS, 2013). 
The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2015) identified cyber risks as a high-impact 
technological risk and ranked it as above average both in likelihood and impact with 
respect to other types of risks. The WEF also makes a distinction between state-
sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal, and terrorist cyber-attack types. 
 
Supply chain resilience frameworks 
The earliest reference to supply chain resilience frameworks found in our literature 
research corresponds to the frameworks proposed by Christopher & Peck at Cranfield 
University (Christopher el at, 2004), and the framework proposed by Sheffi & Rice at 
MIT (Sheffi et al., 2005). These approaches were largely complementary, both 
descriptive in nature and with some points in common such as the requirement for a risk 
culture in the organization as well as the explicit indication of a necessary trade-off 
between redundancy and efficiency at the time or developing organizational resiliency. 
However, while Christopher talks about capabilities required for resilience building and 
critical path identification, Sheffi concentrates on the analysis and mapping of 
vulnerabilities, and describes the dynamic behaviour of the performance of a supply chain 
through a disruption, proposing the concept of “disruption profile”, with the qualitative 
identification of eight main phases within this disruption profile. Additionally, 
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Christopher emphasizes on “agility” for the deployment of existing resources (resulting 
from velocity and visibility within the organization) as a requirement for resilience, while 
Sheffi talks about “flexibility” and the transitory, alternate use of existing resources. 
Subsequent models build on these initial frameworks, and are characterized by 
approximations to the empirical quantification of resilience through case studies. 
Blackhurst (Blackhurst et al., 2011) and her team in 2011, identified thirteen resilience 
enhancers and seven resilience reducers in the organization. On the other hand, Pettit & 
Fiskel (Pettit et al., 2010) from Ohio State University, proposed a SCRAM framework 
(supply chain resiliency assessment and management) in 2010. Through case studies, 
Pettit identifies seven “vulnerability factors” and fourteen “capability factors”. 
Additionally, Pettit identifies an existing trade-off between developing too many unused 
capabilities through excessive investment, which would erode profits, versus developing 
too many vulnerability factors through insufficient investment, which would also erode 
profits through insufficient response to disruptions. 
Work by Linkov (Linkov et al, 2013) at Arizona State University together with the US 
Army in 2013, proposes the concept of cyclic disruption event management through 
which an organization will need to prepare, absorb, recover from and adapt to disruptions, 
point at which a new cycle begins. 
A summary of the chronology and relationship between these frameworks is presented 
in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1 Key supply chain resilience models 
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In a recent 2014 article, Simchi-Levi at MIT described a technique for assessing the 
effect of disruptions on a supply network through the use of Time to Response - TTR, 
Performance Impact scores – PI, and a Risk Exposure Index – REI (Simchi-Levi et al., 
2014). This method simulates the disruption response of a system by removing one node 
in the supply system at a time during the TTR, and optimizing system response, thus 
obtaining a PI for each node. The node with the largest PI is assigned a REI of 1,0, and 
the other nodes are assigned a REI relative to this Larges Rei value. These authors claim 
this method to better guide investment in areas with the greatest impact, is based on 
numerical optimization, and as a simulation it allows for experimentation with different 
TTR values. 
Literature has documented the limitations of current risk assessment methods (Khan 
et al., 2007). These introduce assessment team biases, have a strong influence of past 
subjective experiences, are largely linear and static analyses, and deliver little information 
towards managing exposure to new or extreme events. Additionally, the assessments 
results can show a misalignment with management processes, hindering or delaying the 
implementation of assessment recommendations (Osha, 2008). 
If the risk assessment of potential events is based on the experience of the team making 
the assessment, it is expected that the results will always run behind the new emergent 
modes of attack, characteristic of the cyber threats. 
 
Discussion: Gap identification and tool proposals 
Our literature research appears to show some initial proposals for a research agenda in 
the area of supply chain resilience in general (Khan & Zsidisin, 2011), and cyber 
resilience in particular (Khan & Sepulveda, 2015). We propose that this, as yet, limited 
literature on the topic is founded both in 1) a lack of evidence of a systemic perspective 
of the problem landscape to define a coherent problem space and thus guide research 
efforts, and 2) the lack of proposed complementary tools to established supply chain risk 
assessment methods, which may introduce ways of quantifying the dynamic response of 
a supply chain to disruptions starting from a familiar paradigm to practitioners. 
As potential contributions to bridging the gap, this paper will argue for the use of a 
systemic analysis of the problem landscape description, as well as for the use of 
detectability for quantifying the dynamic response of systems by adding this parameter 
to existing FMCA (Failure mode and Criticality Analysis) processes. 
 
Tool type 1: Systemic outlook of the problem landscape 
Our literature research did not find any systemic analysis of the cyber risk issue, which 
might illustrate, even in qualitative terms, the relationships between the different agents 
in the problem, and which might account for both short and long-term impacts. System 
dynamics tools such as causal loop diagrams (CLD) and stock and flow diagrams (SFD) 
and can be used to map out and quantify the known relationships that exist between actors 
within a complex system (Sterman, 2000), and in order to explore and understand the 
evolution of these relationships and behavioural feedbacks over time. Such a 
diagram/model will be by definition an approximation to reality, and has to have a correct 
balance between aggregation and atomization of variables for the problem we are trying 
to describe.  
It is relevant to keep in mind the interaction between the static configuration of a 
system and its dynamic behaviour. This is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Relation between supply chain dynamic behaviour and static configuration 
Figure 2 shows a feedback loop between an organization’s supply chain static 
configuration and the dynamic behaviour of this supply chain when subject to its 
environment. This dynamic behaviour then feeds back into, and adjusts the static 
configuration according to the available adaptability skills in the supply chain, in an 
ongoing, circular process.  
Since the resilience of an organization in general, and cyber-resilience in particular is 
not an event, but a series of connected events which develop in time as a result of an 
underlying system structure (i.e., behaviour), traditional methods of risk analysis fall 
short of describing these behaviours correctly, and we argue are ill-equipped to manage 
these types of problems. This is tantamount to explaining why breaks are necessary or 
how they should be used in a car, by analysing a series of photos of the car in movement; 
no amount of photos will correctly convey the effects of the car mass or velocity, for 
example, in how the breaks should be applied. 
A first approximation to a causal loop diagram of the problem of cyber-attacks to 
supply chains is shown in Figure 3. This diagram shows three main social spaces where 
this problem develops. The company space reflects the dynamics within an industrial 
organization that promote or hinder investment in cyber-capabilities, how this investment 
relates to the vulnerabilities and resulting number of cyber-attacks, and finally the effect 
this has on customer satisfaction. The hacker space shows the internal process of hacker 
prestige and hacker legal prosecution which respectively promote and hinder the 
development of cyber-attack modes and the number of cyber-attacks. It is important to 
note that these two spaces in this model share at least the number of attacks and the 
technology available. A third space, the public space is present as it creates the social 
tension to promote prosecution of hackers due to the lower level of customer satisfaction 
which results from the hacker attacks. 
A next step after a systemic understanding of the problem landscape, but to which no 
tools have yet been proposed, is to investigate and analyse the dynamics of the system. 
To this end, an SFD is necessary, which not only quantifies the relationships between 
actors that were identified in the CLD, but also integrates dynamic effects such as sources 
of systemic inertia, important delays in the relationships, as well as the identification of 
policy levers. 
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Figure 3 Systemic Analysis if the Problem Landscape 
 
Tool type 2: Bridging the gap- Dynamic response through detectability 
Dynamic behaviour is not an easy subject to convey to practitioners. Therefore a second 
type of tool proposed in this work relates to tools, which might help manage these effects 
in time, through complements to tools which have practitioner use and acceptance. 
Detectability as a risk assessment factor in supply chain risk management had been 
proposed in the past (Sheffi et al., 2012; Lee, 2007) but has eluded widespread application 
for risk assessment processes, as detectability is considered by some a damage-
containment (event mitigating) parameter, more than a risk mitigation factor (Youssef et 
al., 2010). Others argue the counter-intuitive nature of the event detectability when used 
in conjunction with probability and severity: while the higher probability or severity 
associated with a supply chain risk relate to a disruption event that is more relevant, a 
higher detectability, corresponds to an event that is in fact less relevant. Therefore, 
measures of “un-detectability” have rather been suggested. 
We argue here that it is a convenient way to reflect the degree of perceived resilience 
in the organization, and therefore of its dynamic response to disruptions. Based in the 
disruption model presented by Sheffi & Rice (Sheffi et al., 2004), consider the evolution 
of a supply chain process KPI through a disruptive event, as illustrated in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4 Quantitative description of a disruption event curve 
 
This generic KPI, before the disruptive event had an average value of μ1 and a standard 
deviation of σ1. At time t0 this supply chain starts to experience a decrease in this KPI 
beyond the normal levels. This reduction in performance continues to a point when the 
organization reacts and the performance reverts its downward trend at time t0+Δtw, 
reaching a new level of stable operation at time t0+Δtw+ Δtb, with a new mean value for 
this KPI of μ2 and a standard deviation of σ2. At this point we make a proposition for the 
characteristic of this process development: 
 
Proposition 1: The unwanted organizational effects of a disruptive event will have a 
direct relationship with the total duration of the disruption (Δtw and Δtb in Figure 4 
 
Proposition 2: The unwanted organizational effects of a disruptive event will have a 
direct relationship with the decrease in the performance of the supply chain through the 
duration of the disruption (ΔPDmax in Figure 4) 
 
Now, consider two equivalent processes with different detectability. The effect of this 
difference when subjected to a disruptive event can be illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Process comparison 
 
Process 2 as illustrated, has a better detectability (i.e., starts earlier with its KPI 
performance recovery) and is likely to have a smaller organizational adverse effect than 
Process 1. Hence, Process 2 could be identified as more resilient than Process 1. This 
earlier reaction in Process 1 can occur due to any combination of a series of organizational 
capabilities, among them, “awareness” to identify unusual operating conditions, which 
trigger disruption mitigation actions, and /or “flexibility”, to quickly generate the 
organizational adaptations for disruption mitigation. These capabilities relate to the 
“agility” factor for supply chain resilience identified by Christopher (Christopher et al., 
2003). Additionally, the way these capabilities interact during a disruption event, and how 
these capabilities and system structure relate to cyber-attack effects should be analysed 
through a systemic model. 
Such a tool would be especially well suited to supply chains where KPI performance 
measurement is already taking place frequently or online. The quantity and speed with 
which cyber-attacks affect supply chains, makes these type of tools especially well suited 
to these types of risks. The methods for such an implementation stand out as relevant 
research opportunities derived from this work. 
 
Conclusions 
The relevant adverse effects, as well as the increasing number of cyber-attacks on supply 
chains, together with the limited research that has been undertaken to describe and 
manage this phenomenon, makes this a very significant area of research. 
Additionally, any research that is conducted on cyber risk in the supply chain will 
necessarily need close interaction with practitioners, in order to keep up with the speed 
of development of these types of threats, towards shorter cycles of tool development, tool 
proposal and tool validation. Furthermore, a comprehensive research framework which 
has identified all relevant actors and stakeholders in the supply chain and problem 
landscape and has made informed decisions on the priority of cyber resilience 
development for each supply chain area and system participant, should be developed. 
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This paper lays out proposals for bridging some relevant gaps, which serve as stepping 
stones towards tools and methods which might be both accepted and applicable by 
practitioners, as well as coherent with a systemic understanding of the complex problem 
of cyber risks and security in the global supply chain. 
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